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Abstract:  
 
Issue salience and diversity direct a range of outcomes such as voting behavior and 
public policy. Studies, however, have yet to fully integrate theoretical or empirical 
expectations for the effect of issue salience on coalition stability. By focusing on the 
PHFKDQLVPOLQNLQJSDUWLHV·SUHIHrences to policy-making, I propose that parties with 
more diverse platforms provide coalitions greater room to negotiate, whereas parties 
focusing on a small number of issues exacerbate ideological tensions. Issue diversity 
becomes important once parties exhaust opportunities to make the initial, easy policy 
compromises. Using evidence from 299 coalitions in 24 European countries, I find that 
issue diversity in parties· platforms moderates the effect of disagreement. Using a non-
proportional hazard analysis, I find that the effect of issue diversity varies over the 
FRDOLWLRQ·VOLIHF\FOH Governments with parties willing to negotiate over a larger range 
of issues decrease the risk that disagreements will result in coalition termination.  
 
Key Words: Issue attention, issue diversity, coalition duration, ideological 
disagreement, policy change 
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Issue salience directs a range of political outcomes: parties selectively campaign 
on issues to attract votes (Petrocik 1996; De Vries and Hobolt 2012), coalition 
negotiations for ministries depend on SDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVIRUVSHFLILFWRSLFV%नck et al. 
2011; Falcó-Gimeno 2012; Dandoy 2014), and governments distribute public policies 
consistent with their expressed issue priorities (Bevan et al. 2011). Parties prioritize 
important issues by dedicating their resources to them in government. In coalition 
settings, however, policy negotiations and broad disagreements between parties limit 
HDFKLQGLYLGXDOSDUW\·VDELOLW\WRXQLODWHUDOO\GLFWDWHSROLF\RQHDch issue. Instead, 
parties must find policy compromises.  
'HVSLWHHYLGHQFHRILVVXHVDOLHQFH·VLPSRUWDQFH for a range of outcomes, little 
theoretical or empirical work explores its implications on coalition stability and 
duration. Popular accounts of coalition termination, however, emphasize that not only 
disagreement, but also the salience of an issue matter to the stability of governing 
coalitions. News reports often explain that coalition governments in Belgium, for 
example, fall apart due to disagreement on issues of regional autonomy, an extremely 
salient issue for most parties (for instance, see Traynor 2010).1 Extending this 
perspective further, I propose that the distribution of SDUWLHV·attention to issues in 
statements of preferences influences coalition stability. Like the Belgian anecdote, I 
predict that the presence of cabinet parties dedicating the majority of their emphasis to 
a small number of issues increase the chance that disagreements end the coalition 
prematurely. In contrast, cabinets that include parties that distribute their attention to a 
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wider range of issues decrease the risk that disagreement leads to early dissolution; 
these parties are more open to negotiating policy on a wider range of topics.  
I demonstrate support for this perspective by predicting coalition duration using 
a Cox Proportional Hazards model with data from the European Representative 
Democracy Database for 299 coalition governments in 24 European Democracies from 
1945 to 2010 (Andersson et al. 2014). To this data, I add a measure of issue diversity in 
SDUWLHV·HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVWKH(IIHFWLYH1XPEHURI0DQLIHVWR,VVXHV(10,Like 
measures used to study issue diversity in public opinion (McCombs and Zhu 1995), 
election campaigns (Greene 2015), ideological dimensionality (Stoll 2011), attention in 
parliament (e.g. Bevan et al. 2011; Jennings et al. 2011), or policy change (Boydstun et al. 
2015), this variable captures the relative concentration LQHDFKSDUW\·VSODWIRUPto a 
small or large number of issues. The results demonstrate that higher levels of 
ideological disagreement between coalition members increase the risk of termination 
when coupled parties that emphasize only a small number of issues. Consistent with 
the theory, FRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV·(10,moderates the effect of ideological disagreement. 
Furthermore, the discovery of non-proportional hazards in the analysis also provides 
broad evidence in support of the causal mechanism: the effect of the key variables 
change over time as coalition parties reevaluate the current value of staying in office. 
This effect is consistent with a story in which coalitions dedicate resources and time to 
topics that facilitate easy collaboration before shifting to more divisive issues.  
These results hold important implications for research on party and coalition 
behavior as well as our broad conceptions of democratic accountability. Like recent 
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findings related to manifesto construction and government participation (e.g. Dandoy 
2014), these results help connect studies of parliamentary behavior to research on 
election strategy, policy agendas and coalition negotiations. The evidence is consistent 
with an explanation in which SDUWLHV·SULRULWLHVIRUSROLF\RQLVVXHVZRUNLQWDQGHP
with ideological disagreement to determine a range of outcomes. While the specific 
LVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·SODWIRUPVPD\UHIOHFWWKHLUHOHFWRUDOPRWLYDWLRQVWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI
their attention to these issues in office reflects their attempts to pursue policy consistent 
with their electoral pledges. Furthermore, the results suggest that policy compromise 
may be more easily facilitated amongst parties that are not only ideologically close, but 
also among parties campaigning on a wide range of topics.  
 
Coalitions and Party Preferences 
A multitude of factors influence the length of time coalition governments stay 
together (Laver 2003; Saalfeld 2008).2 Scholars show that ideological preferences play a 
key role in explaining coalition duration (e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tsebelis 2002; 
Laver 2003; Saalfeld 2008; Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010). Warwick (1994), for example, 
shows that the relative preferences of coalition members influence the FDELQHW·Vability 
to generate policy outputs. Tsebelis (2002) adds that greater ideological distance 
between partisan veto players limits WKHFRDOLWLRQ·VDELOLW\WRSURGXFHSROLF\FKDQJHV
Broadly, these theories predict that ideologically diverse coalitions have a limited range 
of policies on which they can agree to develop policies. These coalitions end earlier than 
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ideologically compact coalitions because they will have difficulty responding to 
changing world events.  
Party preferences also influence cabinet stability E\LPSDFWLQJSDUWLHV·DOWHUQDWH
coalition options. Ideologically connected coalitions - those where all parties 
represented in parliament holding preferences falling between the most ideologically 
extreme coalition partners are included - increase coalition stability because few 
possible alternative coalition configurations would be more preferred by coalition 
parties (de Swaan 1973; Warwick 1979, 1992, and 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999). 
ThHUHODWLYHORFDWLRQRISDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVDOVRPDWWHUV0RGHUDWHRU¶FHQWULVW·SDUWLHV 
LQFUHDVHFDELQHWV·VWDELOLW\(Van Roozendaal 1997).  Laver and Shepsle (1996) add that 
the participation of parties that hold the median seat on the primary dimensions of 
conflict in parliament (and the corresponding cabinet portfolios) LQFUHDVHWKHFRDOLWLRQ·V
stability. These parties gain little benefit from alternate coalition arrangements. 
Alternatively, some evidence indicates that ideologically central parties may increase 
the likelihood of failure because they possess greater options for different coalition 
partners and make fewer policy plans in advance (Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010).  
Altogether, these studies find that preferences play an important role in coalition 
duration. An underlying theme in this research shows that preferences limit SDUWLHV·
options for alterQDWHFRDOLWLRQFRQILJXUDWLRQVRUFRQVWUDLQFRDOLWLRQV·abilities to 
negotiate policy compromises. Despite these advances, few studies consider the 
combined influence of party preferences and issue salience for coalition behavior. 
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However, research on coalition formation and policy change highlights the role 
of issue salience. There is evidence that both issue priorities and preferences influence 
government formation and behavior. Coalition negotiations, for instance, take longer 
between more ideologically distant parties (Martin and Vanberg 2003). Future cabinet 
parties prioritize salient issues in their negotiations for cabinet portfolios (Bनck et al. 
2011). Ideologically divisive coalitions often face delegation problems when issues 
become salient, although parliamentary rules provide governments with the tools to 
overcome many disagreements (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011 and 2014). For example, 
coalition parties appoint RYHUVLJKW´ZDWFKGRJµ junior ministers to portfolios with 
jurisdictions covering salient issues to monitor their coalition partners. Issue salience is 
particularly important for ministers from ideologically distant parties (Thies 2001; 
Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014). Parties are less likely to engage in 
oversight activities on portfolios, however, when the issue is tangential to their own 
issue priorities (Falcó-Gimeno 2014). More broadly, principal-agent perspectives show 
that policies often represent DFRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQFRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVand 
priorities (Martin and Vanberg 2011 and 2014).  
There is evidence that ideological disagreement and issue salience in coalition 
settings hold further consequences for government policies. PartLHV·LVVXHSULRULWLHV, for 
example, often lead to changes in policy (see for example, Hibbs 1977; Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Bevan et al. 2011; Bevan and Greene 
2015).  Bevan et al. (2011) show that the distribution of issues within SDUWLHV·DJHQGD
leads to consistent policy changes, although world events and economic conditions 
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FRQVWUDLQJRYHUQPHQWV·DELOLW\WRIRFXVsolely on partisan goals (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2010). Research from a veto player perspective adds that the relative 
distance between parties limits the range of potential changes to status quo policies 
(Tsebelis 2002).   
Altogether, studies of coalition behavior, party preferences and issue salience 
illustrate a complex relationship. Like this research, I propose that issue salience and 
disagreement jointly constrain SDUWLHV·DELOLWLHV to govern effectively. Coalitions 
incapable of maintaining and developing broad compromises due to disagreements on 
salient issues end prematurely. Governments prepared to negotiate their resources on a 
wide range of issues can last longer in the face of disagreement.   
 
Hypotheses on the Consequences of Issue Diversity and Party Preferences 
 
In this section, I outline the logic for hypotheses linking issue diversity and 
policy disagreement to coalition duration. I propose that coalitions composed of parties 
willing to compromise on a greater diversity of issues will be more stable than 
coalitions containing parties compromising on a narrower range of topics. Issue 
diversity and salience moderate the effect ideological disagreements have on coalition 
SDUWLHV·DELOLW\WRQHJRWLDWHSROLF\FRPSURPLVH&RDOLWLRQVXQDEOHWRUHVSRQGWRSROLF\
demands on important issues will be forced to end sooner than more flexible coalitions 
able to pursue policy change on a diverse set of issues. Consequently, the effect of issue 
diversity will be greatest later in the cRDOLWLRQ·VWHUP.  
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Issue salience and diversity are important for policy change and coalition 
stability because they indicate the breadth of SDUWLHV·SROLF\JRDOVDQGPRWLYDWLRQWR
develop policies. Following from electoral accountability and issue attention 
perspectives, parties in a coalition government will be unwilling to consider policy 
compromises on issues they excluded from their election campaigns. Addressing these 
issues will make the parties appear unaccountable for the issues they emphasized in 
their election campaigns (e.g. Downs 1957; Carey 2008; Kam 2008). 3 Furthermore, the 
issues parties did not include in their campaigns are likely those that coalition parties 
sought to avoid in the last election due to their historic policy reputations, the rise of 
issue focused competitors, or because they hold relatively unpopular positions on those 
issues (e.g. Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2005, 2008; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Greene 2015).  
Past research indicates that focused attention on issues guides SDUWLHV·EHKDYLRU
in government. Parties gain cabinet portfolios consistent with their most salient issues 
(e.g. Bनck et al. 2011), use oversight mechanisms on portfolios containing salient issues 
controlled by their coalition partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 
2014), and even implement policies relating to their most salient issues (Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen 2010; Bevan et al. 2011). The logic follows that an overly narrow issue 
focus ties the hands of parties if they intend to foster an image of accountability. 
Instead, parties that distribute their attention to a wide range of topics are likely 
freer to develop policies in the face of ideological disagreement. From this perspective, 
parties campaign broadly across issues to attract support, but avoid perceptions of 
incompetence or a lack of accountability. Disagreements over any single issue become 
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less important, as coalition parties have more discretion to develop policies across a 
range of topics.4 Furthermore, b\VSUHDGLQJDWWHQWLRQDFURVVQXPHURXVLVVXHVSDUWLHV·
positions on individual issues likely become ambiguous or blurred (e.g. Shepsle 1972; 
Rovny 2012, 2013; Somer-Topcu 2014; Greene 2015).5 Log rolls or policy trades on 
relatively unimportant issues they addressed in their platforms become possible 
because the parties do not fear appearing unaccountable. 
Issue salience also plays an important role in contexts with little disagreement. 
When cabinet preferences are relatively close, parties allow greater discretion to their 
coalition partners. The risk of policy disagreements on an issue decreases when parties 
hold similar preferences. Coalition parties, for example, are less likely to engage in 
policy oversight using tools such as junior ministers to monitor ideologically close 
coalition partners (Thies 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Martin and Vanberg 2011; 
Greene and Jensen 2014). More broadly, legislative involvement in the implementation 
of policies increases along with the degree of conflict between the minister and coalition 
parties to reduce the likelihood of ministerial drift (Franchino and Høyland 2009). 
Parties receive cabinet portfolios (Bनck et al. 2011) and use junior ministers on the issues 
most salient to them (Greene and Jensen 2014). Because they dedicate greater relative 
attention to those issues, parties that only emphasize a small number of issues in an 
otherwise ideological cohesive coalition, therefore, likely earn more policy discretion on 
these issues.6 From this perspective, ideologically close parties allow each other 
discretion to oversee the policy implementation of their most salient issues.  
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The effect of disagreement will be strongest on issues that the partners hold most 
salient. Ideological disagreement decreases the range of acceptable changes to the status 
quo (Tsebelis 2002). Parties overly focused on a small number of issues signal their 
unwillingness to negotiate or compromise on policies addressing those topics because.7 
To these parties, deviation from their limited set of salient issues redirects time and 
resources to issues other than those on which they campaigned. Attention to issues they 
excluded from their platforms increases the risk of appearing unaccountable and 
unfocused on their policy priorities. *LYHQSDUOLDPHQWV·OLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVHJ'|ULQJ
2003), parties avoid attaching resources to issues they hold unimportant, particularly if 
the policy change would require greater compromise away from the SDUW\·SRVLWLRQRQ
that issue.  
Although coalitions will likely develop agreements on which issues they will 
compromise prior to forming a coalition (e.g. Golder 2006; Bनck et al. 2011; Eichorst 
2014; Greene and Jensen 2014; Ibenskas 2015), exogenous events cause other issues to 
become important. For example, changing economic conditions and world events 
necessitate that responsive cabinets address unforeseen topics (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2010). The regular use of control mechanisms in coalition settings, such as 
junior ministers or parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor and oversee policies in coalition 
governance may even exacerbate policy-making tensions as ministers lack the 
discretion and flexibility to unilaterally determine policy (e.g. Saalfeld 2000; Martin and 
Vanberg 2011). 8 Like previous studies of coalition duration (e.g. Warwick 1994), I 
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assume that coalitions failing to deliver policies in response to unforeseen changes will 
terminate prematurely.   
Altogether, I argue that the relative VDOLHQFHRILVVXHVLQFRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV·DJHQGDV
moderates the effect of disagreement on government survival. Coalition parties 
emphasizing a large range of issues can work together more easily in the context of high 
disagreement, but coalitions of parties with strong emphasis on a small number of 
issues will be unwilling to negotiate policies in the face of large disagreements. At lower 
levels of disagreement, issue salience becomes less important as parties allow greater 
discretion to ministers or deliberate on policies broadly in advance. This logic leads to 
the first hypothesis. 
 
H1:  Coalitions containing parties with a larger diversity of issues in their platforms 
UHGXFHWKHHIIHFWRILGHRORJLFDOGLVDJUHHPHQWLQFUHDVLQJWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VGXUDWLRQ 
 
PolLF\FRPSURPLVHOLQNVWKHEUHDGWKDQGVDOLHQFHRISDUWLHV·DJHQGDVWRFRDOLWLRQ
duration. Coalitions consisting of parties incapable of collaborating and responding to 
world events will end prematurely (e.g. Warwick 1994). Policy disagreements, however, 
takHRQGLIIHUHQWLPSRUWDQFHWKURXJKRXWWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VWHUPLQRIILFH)RUH[DPSOHWKH
inability to agree on policy compromise might be less important immediately before a 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\PDQGDWHGHOHFWLRQWKDQLPPHGLDWHO\IROORZLQJWKHFRDOLWLRQ·V
formation (see, for example, Strøm and Swindle 2002). Studies of parliamentary 
behavior and policy often emphasize a link between parliamentary behavior, policy and 
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the timing of elections (Huber 1996; Döring 2003; Smith 2003; Bevan and Greene 2015). 
For example, coalitions work through easy policy compromises early in the legislative 
cycle before turning to more difficult policy areas (Martin and Vanberg 2008).  Likewise, 
governments are more likely to use parliamentary procedures to contrast individual 
03V·GLIIerences with their own leadership leading up to elections (Huber 1996).  
Connecting this research to coalition behavior, I hypothesize that issue salience 
and disagreement will take on greater importance later in the legislative cycle. Policies 
agreed upon in coalition negotiations require time for governments to implement. 
Coalitions will need to develop solutions to large ideological disagreements prior to 
forming a government (Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010). The benefits to staying involved 
in a coalition government also decrease as new constitutionally mandated elections 
approach. Disagreements, therefore, become more important as the value of staying in 
office decreases and unanticipated issues arise later in the coalition cycle.   
This perspective implies that the effect of issue salience is not immediate. Being 
capable of compromising on a wide range of issues only becomes important once the 
initially agreed upon policies are implemented or new, unexpected policy demands are 
placed on the government. Based on this logic, I predict that the moderating effect of 
issue diversity will only become important later in the legislative cycle (once initial 
compromises have been completed).  
 
H2: The moderating effect of issue diversity will be stronger later in the legislative cycle 
(as the next constitutionally mandated election nears). 
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Data and Methods 
,RSHUDWLRQDOL]HWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHDVWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VQXPEHURIGD\VLQRIILFH
before it terminates into a new coalition that contains a different set of parties or an 
election is held. Similar to Saalfeld (2008) and Deirmeier and Stevenson (1999), I analyze 
the joint risk of coalition terminations in a competing risk framework to test for the 
alternate logics leading to each type of failure: a new cabinet or a new election.9 For the 
combined risk, I pool together all failures and right-censor terminations occurring for 
technical reasons such as the death of the prime minister or to regularly scheduled 
elections. The data on coalition duration and composition comes from the European 
Representative Democracy Data Archive (ERDDA) (Andersson et al. 2014).10 I only include 
coalition governments or those cabinets containing more than one party according to 
the ERDDA because the hypotheses do not directly predict the ability of a single-party 
government to maintain parliamentary support. The resulting sample includes 299 
coalition governments in 24 European Democracies from 1945-2010.11  On average, 
coalitions last approximately 737 days with a standard deviation of 518 days. 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and primary independent variables are 
presented in Table 1. 
While a substantial literature discusses the measurement of government survival 
as a dependent variable, the operationalization of salience and breadth, namely issue 
GLYHUVLW\RILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·DJHQGDVLVOHVVFOHDU+RZHYHUSXEOLFSROLFy and media 
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scholars have long been interested in studying the size of the government or media 
policy agenda (see, for example, McCombs and Zhu 1995; John and Jennings 2010; 
Jennings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014). Like these scholars I convert a measure of 
entropy6KDQQRQ·V+ to a measure of diversity (see the Appendix) to characterize both 
WKHRYHUDOOQXPEHURIWRSLFVDQGWKHLUUHODWLYHVDOLHQFHLQSDUWLHV·SODWIRUPV using data 
from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens 2015). In particular, I measure the 
HIIHFWLYHQXPEHURILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·SODWIRUPV(10,12 For the main analysis, I 
aggregate this variable to the coalition level by finding the average coalition ENMI. I 
refer to this variable as C-(10,RUWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VDYHUDJH(10, 13 Figure 1 presents C-
ENMI over the course of the sample with selective country labels. Like individual 
SDUWLHV·(10,HJ*UHHQHWKHUHLVDQXSZDUGWUHQGRYHUDOODVSDUWLHVDQG
consequently cabinets now discuss more issues in the past.14 See the Appendix for 
additional discussion of the primary independent variable.  
<<<Figure 1 HERE>>> 
8VLQJWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VDYHUDJH(10,DVDJHQHUDOPHDVXUHRIWKHLUSULRULW\IRU
detailed policy goals or collaboration on a larger number of issues, I then create an 
interaction between the C-ENMI and the level of ideological disagreement in the 
coalition.15  ,PHDVXUHLGHRORJLFDOGLVDJUHHPHQWDVWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHFRDOLWLRQ·V
PRVWH[WUHPHSDUWLHVXVLQJ/RZHHWDO·VORJVFDOH/RZHHWDO16 I operationalize 
coalition disagreement as the absolute value of this difference. Larger values indicate 
greater disagreement, whereas smaller values indicate a more ideologically cohesive 
coalition. 
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In addition to the primary independent variables included in this analysis, I 
DFFRXQWIRUDQXPEHURIWKHRUHWLFDOO\LPSRUWDQWYDULDEOHVWRFRQWUROIRUWKHFRDOLWLRQ·V
initial bargaining conditions. I control for the coalition type using dummy variables for 
minimum winning coalitions and surplus majority coalitions as measures from the 
ERDDA. Both types of coalitions likely last longer than the alternative: a minority 
coalition. I include a measure of ideologically connected coalitions using the measure 
from the ERDDA. The variable equals one when all the parties in parliament that hold 
preferences on the primary dimension of conflict within the range of the most extreme 
coalition parties are members of the coalition (e.g. Warwick 1979; Diermeier and 
Stevenson 1999). In addition, I include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
coalition includes a party holding the median position on the most important and 
second most important ideological dimensions as measured by the ERDDA. Dimension 
by dimension median parties may increase the risk of termination as they potentially 
have a larger number of ideologically close coalition partners.17 To control for the 
relative preferences of the greater legislative body and the potential for alternative 
coalition partners (Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010), I measure the amount of polarization 
in the larger legislative body. I measure polarization as the difference between the left-
ULJKWSRVLWLRQVRIWKHPRVWH[WUHPHSDUWLHVLQWKHOHJLVODWXUHXVLQJ/RZHHWDO·V
logged left-right scale.  
I also control for institutional factors by including dummy variables for whether 
there is a powerful upper house in a parliament, if the government requires an absolute 
majority confidence vote or a constructive vote of confidence, and whether there is a 
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popularly elected president who can disband the cabinet (Müller and Strøm 1999 and 
2003; Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009 and Elgie 2011). I include a 
variable counting the days to the next mandatory election to account for differences in 
the Constitutional inter-election period (e.g. Lupia and Strøm 1995). Finally, I control for 
electoral conditions at the end of the coalition by including the inflation and 
unemployment from the ERDDA. Positive inflation and low unemployment both 
increase the risk of an early election as coalition parties expect voters to reward them for 
the economy (Saalfeld 2008 and 2013). I run the models with and without economic 
variables because these data are limited for earlier periods. 
Following from methodological advancements in the study of coalitions, I test 
the primary hypotheses using an event-history framework. Event-history models are 
more appropriate for longitudinal and comparative analysis than traditional cross-
sectional time series regression techniques because event history analysis directly 
models the effect of the important variables on time in an essentially comparative 
framework rather than seeking to limit the impact of time on the analysis (King et al. 
1990; Warwick 1992; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; 
Saalfeld 2008). LiNH6DDOIHOG,DGRSW'LHUPHLHUDQG6WHYHQVRQ·VDSSURDFK
to estimating cabinet termination from a competing risks framework. This entails 
estimating three separate models of cabinet termination that account for right censoring 
in the dependent variable to analyze specific subsets of termination hazards (all 
terminations, replacement coalitions and early elections). In addition, I account for right 
censoring in the data from a number of different sources unrelated to my theoretical 
17 
 
perspective including terminations (the death of the Prime Minister or a regularly 
scheduled election). In the replacement and early election models, the estimates predict 
the risk of termination for coalitions that are replaced by new coalitions versus 
coalitions that end in elections prior to the final constitutionally mandated date. I cluster 
the standard errors for all cabinets that follow an election to account for heterogeneity 
caused by the inclusion of multiple coalitions following the same election.18   
Finally, the theory expects a violation in a key assumption inherent to most event 
history models, the proportional hazards assumption; I predict that the moderating 
effect of C-ENMI will change depending on the value of the dependent variable. Like 
previous analyses using non-proportional hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; 
Licht 2011), I include an interaction of the theoretically offending variables with the 
natural log of time.19 This specification allows me to directly test whether the 
moderating effect of C-(10,EHFRPHVPRUHLPSRUWDQWODWHULQDFRDOLWLRQ·VWHUPLQ
office. I present the results from the primary analyses in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4. In 
each table, I first show the results of a simple analysis with only the key independent 
variables and the interaction with the log of time,20 before presenting two sets of models 
without the time interaction and two models accounting for the non-proportionality. 
 
Results 
The results from the Cox hazards model in each table provide evidence in favor 
of Hypothesis 1; the coefficient for C-ENMI and its interaction with ideological 
disagreement is negative in the models that do not include the interaction of time. 
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Coalitions with larger coalition C-ENMI reduce the risk of failure caused by ideological 
disagreement. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level 
for the combined risk and replacement risk models.  The coefficients are in the correct 
direction in the election risk models, but not significantly different from zero.  
 <<<TABLE 2 HERE>>> 
To show this effect for replacement cabinets, Figure 2 predicts the hazard rate for 
cabinets at risk of replacement at high levels of disagreement (one standard deviation 
above the mean) for two levels of C-ENMI (one standard deviation below and above the 
mean level of C-ENMI).21 For coalitions above the mean level of disagreement, C-ENMI 
decreases the risk of a new coalition caused by ideological disagreement. C-ENMI 
provides a stabilizing impact as predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
<<<FIGURE 2 HERE>>> 
 
In general, the results for the combined risk and replacement risk of termination 
support the first hypothesis. The results for cabinets ending in new elections are 
inconsistent with the first hypothesis in Table 4. The second hypothesis, however, 
predicts a more complicated relationship. The estimated coefficients are likely biased if 
the proportional hazards assumption is violated. 
Empirically, a test of the residuals based in each of the models testing only the 
first hypothesis provide some evidence of a more complicated relationship.  In contrast 
to many studies of government duration, 22 a test of the proportional hazards 
assumption using the Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the estimates in many of the 
models fail global tests of proportionality.23 Stated differently, the effect of one or more 
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independent variables relative to the baseline hazard rate of coalition termination is not 
consistent across the length of observed coalitions.  
<<<TABLE 3 HERE>>> 
This non-proportionality may explain the inconsistent effect of ideological 
disagreement and ENMI for new elections in Table 4.  To directly test the hypotheses in 
the non-proportional framework, I re-estimate the models, but allow the moderating 
effect of C-ENMI on ideological disagreement to change over time using.24   
The results from the non-proportional analysis demonstrate clearer support for 
the second hypothesis for all non-proportional models.25 Consistent with the theory, the 
coefficients indicate that the effect of C-ENMI is non-proportional, although the 
coefficients for the interaction of coalition mean ENMI and disagreement (not interacted 
with time) are in the wrong direction. These coefficients imply that on the first day of 
the coalition, disagreement and C-ENMI together increase the risk of early termination. 
However, coalition ENMI and its interaction of disagreement when interacted with time 
are negative and statistically different from zero for each type of coalition termination. 
This suggests that the long term effect of both coalition C-ENMI and the interaction 
stabilizes the coalition, although it might initially increase the risk of termination.  
Given the large number of interactions, the combined effect of C-ENMI in each of 
the models is difficult to interpret using coefficients alone (Licht 2011). To demonstrate 
the non-proportional impact of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement, I present the 
first difference percentage change in the baseline hazard rate for cabinets at risk of 
replacement and new elections in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for coalitions at low 
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disagreement and high disagreement (one standard deviation below and above the 
mean).26  
<<< FIGURE 3 HERE>>> 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show support for the second hypothesis. In both figures, 
the results greatly differ according to the degree of ideological disagreement. Indeed, 
the moderating effect of ENMI actually increases the risk of termination at low levels of 
disagreement. For higher levels of disagreement, however, ENMI decreases the effect of 
GLVDJUHHPHQWODWHULQWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VOLIHF\FOHConsistent with a moderating effect of 
ENMI (as predicted by H2), immediately following the formation of a new cabinet C-
ENMI actually increases the risk of a cabinet being replaced in the first years of a 
coalition. This effect is significant for the first year of the cabinet.27 However, the effect 
of C-ENMI decreases and eventually changes to become a stabilizing force. C-ENMI 
decreases the risk of termination after the coalition has lasted for approximately two 
years, although the exact point the effect switches depends on the level of disagreement. 
By around the end of the third year of a coalition with disagreement at one standard 
deviation above the mean, C-ENMI reduces the risk of a replacement cabinet relative 
and early elections relative to the baseline hazard by just over 50%.  Broadly, this 
finding is consistent with the explanation that C-ENMI reduces the effect of ideological 
disagreement once easy policy compromises have been reached for the risk of both 
replacement cabinets and early elections.  
<<<FIGURE 4 HERE>>> 
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Finally, the controls generally perform as the previous literature expects in Table 
2 and Table 3. Many of these variables also exhibit previously unexplored non-
proportional effects for the risk of new elections. Surplus majority coalitions increase 
the risk of replacement in some models, but decrease the risk of new elections. 
Minimum winning coalitions generally are at a decreased risk of termination. 
Ideologically connected coalitions have no statistically significant effect. Requirements 
for an absolute majority of parliament or constructive confidence rules generally do not 
LPSDFWWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VWHQXUHInstitutions such as presidentialism and bicameralism 
increase the risk of termination in the combined models, only bicameralism consistently 
shows a statistically significant effect in the competing risks analysis. These coefficients 
likely imply that alternate veto points that can delay or block legislation likely decrease 
JRYHUQPHQWV·DELOLW\WRLPSOHPHQWSROLF\e.g. Strøm and Swindle 2002). Lack of 
concurrent majorities for coalitions in bicameral countries may also limit the ability to 
negotiate policy compromises (e.g. Druckman and Thies 2002).  The coefficients for 
FRDOLWLRQVWKDWLQFOXGHSDUWLHVDWWKHSDUOLDPHQW·VGLPHQVLRQ-by-dimension median 
ideological position generally decrease the risk of termination, but are not statistically 
different from zero; this might indicate that other measures of ideology better capture 
SDUWLHV·RXWVLGHRSWLRQV As Maoz and Somer-Topçu (2010) may have predicted, 
parliaments with larger ideological ranges generally have a slightly decreased risk of 
being replaced, but the effect is not statistically significant for the risk of new elections. 
Coalitions with longer constitutionally mandated inter-election periods or days until 
the next mandatory election face a reduced risk of both forms of termination as Lupia 
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and Strøm (1995) would predict. Finally, the coefficients for inflation and 
unemployment are statistically significant in most of the models, although inflation has 
a more consistent effect across specifications. 
 
Discussion 
The theory presented here seeks to directly consider the relationship and identify 
the mechanism connecting ideological disagreement, issue salience and coalition 
behavior over time3URYLGHGWKDWHOHFWRUDOSODWIRUPVUHIOHFWDEDODQFHRIWKHSDUW\·V
policy and electoral goals, issue diversity in party platforms provide a window into the 
SDUW\·VUHODWLYHSULRULW\IRUGHWDLOHGSROLF\JRDOVRUDEURDGHUZLOOLQJQHVVWRQHJRWLDWH
their policy goals on a large number of issues. Parties with a large number of issues 
stabilize ideologically contentious coalitions through their willingness to work on a 
range of topics once the initial easy policy agreements have been completed. Coalitions 
of ideologically distant parties have a chance at long term survival if the parties are 
willing to work on a range of issues to stay in office. However, parties that only 
prioritize a small number of issues, such as language and regional issues in Belgium, 
exacerbate ideological tensions once the coalition accounts for its initial compromises. 
Parties with greater issue diversity mitigate ideological tensions. The Belgian five party-
cabinet led by Martens in 1988, for example, faced high levels of disagreement, but was 
likely stabilized by comparably high levels of C-ENMI.28 Based on this perspective, a 
coalition government designed to maximize stability with high levels of ideological 
23 
 
disagreement would include coalition parties that campaign on a large diversity of 
issues.   
This article tests the theory using an event history analysis of coalition duration 
in 24 European Democracies using a new measure from party manifestos, the coalition 
mean ENMI. Using both proportional and non-proportional hazards competing risk 
analysis, I show that issue diversity in party platforms mediates the relationship 
between ideological disagreement and coalition duration. C-ENMI moderates the extent 
to which ideological disagreement increases the risk that a coalition will break up. 
Second, I perform a thorough test of the theory using a non-proportional hazards 
analysis for coalitions at risk of new elections. I demonstrate that parties with more 
comprehensive platforms significantly decrease the risk of breaking up later in the 
FRDOLWLRQ·VWHUPIdeologically diverse coalitions may initially increase the risk of a 
replacement cabinet or new election, but stabilize cabinets in the long term. These 
results are robust to a range of modeling choices as presented in the Appendix.  
The empirical tests confirm a theoretical and methodological explanation for the 
weak findings connecting disagreement to coalition duration (Warwick 1994; Tsebelis 
2002; Saalfeld 2008). The analyses are consistent with the explanation that the inability 
to negotiate policy leads coalitions to terminate early. Each additional issue parties 
include in their platforms may provide coalition partners with greater room to negotiate 
policy compromises and engage in log rolls. Parties that include substantial detail on a 
small number of issues may view compromise as too far outside their range of 
acceptability even if they constitute a relative improvement over the status quo. This 
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evidence indicates that studies of parliamentary behavior would benefit by 
LQFRUSRUDWLQJSDUWLHV·ZLOOLQJQHVVWRQHJRWLDWHDFURVVD range of issues. Current models 
of public policy and parliamentary behavior may under predict the effect of ideological 
GLVDJUHHPHQWEHFDXVHWKH\GRQRWLQFRUSRUDWHSDUWLHV·ZLOOLQJQHVVWRIRUHJRSROLF\
details as a bargaining tool.  
Finally, by accounting for non-proportional effects, I add that issue diversity can 
LQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV·VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDWGLIIHUHQWSRLQWVLQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\
schedule in different ways. Although previous research found limited evidence of non-
proportionalities (Warwick 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999), strategic bargaining 
contexts such as cabinet formation and termination generally face competing strategies 
that change over time as legislation and other factors influence the payoffs from 
bargaining (Licht 2011). The results here indicate that ideological disagreements leading 
WRFRDOLWLRQWHUPLQDWLRQDULVHZLWKLQWKHILUVWRQHWRWZR\HDUVIROORZLQJDFRDOLWLRQ·V
IRUPDWLRQ7KLVOLQNVZHOOZLWK0DUWLQDQG9DQEHUJ·V (2008) contention that easy 
agreements are dealt with quickly in coalition settings. However, the finding that higher 
levels of ENMI decrease the risk of early election terminations towards the end of the 
FRDOLWLRQ·VSRWHQWLDOGXUDWLRQPD\LQGLFDWHWKDWWKH\DUHPRUHVWUDWHJLFDERXWWKHWLPLQJ
of the next election than parties with fewer issues (Strøm and Swindle 2002; Smith 
2003). Strategic bargaining contexts likely require accounting for non-proportional 
effects at both the theoretical and empirical stages. These results connect to other recent 
perspectives VXFKDV'UXFNPDQ·V(2008) call for dynamic studies of coalition behavior 
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by suggesting a more dynamic approach to studying coalitions from a temporal 
perspective. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Count 
Duration in Days 737 518 11 1935 299 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
.488 .356 0 1.73 299 
ENMI 17.1 4.4 5.5 26.3 299 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
.298 .458 0 1 299 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
.475 .5 0 1 299 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
.522 .5 0 1 299 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
.308 .462 0 1 299 
Parliamentary Range 1.11 .526 .0919 3.03 299 
Presidentialism .144 .351 0 1 299 
Bicameralism .181 .385 0 1 299 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
.197 .399 0 1 299 
Constructive 
Confidence 
.147 .355 0 1 299 
Unemployment Rate 6.88 4.24 .1 19.6 267 
Inflation 10.1 23.4 -3 210 287 
Days to next election 1228 418 39 1935 299 
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Table 2. Cox Hazards Analysis of the Combined Risk of Coalition Termination 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Simple No Econ Full No Econ X 
ln(t) 
Full X ln(t) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
1.301* 2.404*** 2.466*** 2.774*** 2.723*** 
(0.564) (0.519) (0.535) (0.574) (0.605) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
0.629*** -0.121*** -0.135*** 0.636*** 0.639*** 
(0.089) (0.029) (0.030) (0.073) (0.077) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI X ln(t) 
-0.106***   -0.116*** -0.117*** 
(0.011)   (0.010) (0.010) 
C-ENMI 0.008 0.066** 0.081*** 0.084** 0.091** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
 -0.592** -0.578** -0.831*** -0.804*** 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.190) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
 -1.017*** -0.962*** -1.134*** -1.059*** 
 (0.175) (0.182) (0.171) (0.188) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
 0.164 0.148 0.186 0.184 
 (0.126) (0.132) (0.128) (0.137) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
 0.009 0.045 0.004 0.041 
 (0.164) (0.175) (0.146) (0.151) 
Parliamentary Range  -0.315* -0.320* -0.606*** -0.589*** 
  (0.138) (0.143) (0.146) (0.157) 
Presidentialism  0.627** 0.453+ 0.592** 0.367 
  (0.210) (0.241) (0.214) (0.255) 
Bicameralism  0.657** 0.692*** 0.589** 0.602** 
  (0.218) (0.203) (0.193) (0.184) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
 0.236 0.326 0.047 0.158 
 (0.197) (0.224) (0.201) (0.227) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
 -0.032 -0.214 -0.094 -0.263 
 (0.175) (0.210) (0.210) (0.243) 
Unemployment Rate   0.047**  0.051** 
   (0.015)  (0.016) 
Inflation   0.008***  0.005** 
   (0.002)  (0.002) 
Days to next election  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AIC 2329.555 2386.520 2060.424 2200.033 1893.052 
BIC 2344.357 2434.626 2114.232 2251.839 1950.448 
ǘ2 114.350 189.145 185.638 435.760 441.190 
Log Likelihood -1160.777 -1180.260 -1015.212 -1086.016 -930.526 
Observations 299 299 267 299 267 
Results are from a Cox Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the 
change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present 
p-values in parentheses. A model including the economic variables and interactions with time do not 
converge. All significance tests are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3. Cox Hazards Analysis of the Risk of a Replacement Cabinet 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Simple No Econ Full No Econ X 
ln(t) 
Full X ln(t) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.574*** 2.843*** 3.018*** 3.391*** 3.628*** 
(0.743) (0.717) (0.801) (0.960) (1.028) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
1.068*** -0.170*** -0.182*** 1.090*** 1.005*** 
(0.245) (0.048) (0.055) (0.261) (0.217) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI X ln(t) 
-0.185***   -0.191*** -0.181*** 
(0.033)   (0.033) (0.028) 
C-ENMI 0.039 0.087* 0.095* 0.116** 0.124** 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
 0.103 0.010 -0.158 -0.275 
 (0.378) (0.431) (0.385) (0.436) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
 -0.852* -0.933* -0.770+ -0.906* 
 (0.360) (0.396) (0.409) (0.451) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
 0.231 0.101 0.250 0.163 
 (0.265) (0.272) (0.260) (0.272) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
 -0.158 -0.139 -0.288 -0.322 
 (0.284) (0.303) (0.325) (0.349) 
Parliamentary Range  -0.608* -0.677* -1.001** -1.112** 
  (0.297) (0.321) (0.359) (0.378) 
Presidentialism  0.666* 0.587 0.662* 0.578 
  (0.285) (0.411) (0.273) (0.407) 
Bicameralism  0.451 0.610+ 0.135 0.389 
  (0.327) (0.352) (0.410) (0.380) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
 0.405 0.743+ 0.182 0.486 
 (0.339) (0.382) (0.372) (0.427) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
 0.018 -0.333 -0.097 -0.391 
 (0.401) (0.454) (0.495) (0.540) 
Unemployment Rate   0.012  0.007 
   (0.028)  (0.031) 
Inflation   0.011***  0.007* 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Days to next election  0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AIC 705.207 793.320 671.707 695.574 587.925 
BIC 720.009 841.425 725.515 747.381 645.321 
ǘ2 71.058 57.209 74.396 114.478 123.127 
Log Likelihood -348.604 -383.660 -320.853 -333.787 -277.963 
Observations 299 299 267 299 267 
Results are from a Cox Non-Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the 
change in the baseline hazard of termination.  Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present 
p-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 4. Cox Hazards Analysis of the Risk of a Cabinet Ending in New Elections 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Simple No Econ Full No Econ X 
ln(t) 
Full X ln(t) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
1.545 2.989+ 1.543 3.937* 2.127 
(1.299) (1.732) (1.736) (1.726) (1.845) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
0.653*** -0.137 -0.083 0.536** 0.550** 
(0.116) (0.092) (0.092) (0.183) (0.195) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI X ln(t) 
-0.126***   -0.118*** -0.108*** 
(0.020)   (0.026) (0.027) 
C-ENMI -0.002 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.046 
 (0.042) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.055) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
 -0.470 -0.732+ -0.538 -0.779+ 
 (0.390) (0.433) (0.417) (0.461) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
 -0.771* -0.675+ -0.919* -0.791+ 
 (0.338) (0.390) (0.381) (0.435) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
 -0.079 -0.135 -0.066 -0.128 
 (0.268) (0.325) (0.311) (0.378) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
 -0.411 -0.127 -0.399 -0.086 
 (0.348) (0.382) (0.369) (0.392) 
Parliamentary Range  -0.129 -0.104 -0.309 -0.314 
 (0.249) (0.271) (0.300) (0.341) 
Presidentialism  0.257 0.420 0.171 0.262 
  (0.404) (0.402) (0.372) (0.414) 
Bicameralism  0.856* 0.844* 0.858* 0.765+ 
  (0.383) (0.394) (0.391) (0.411) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
 -0.061 -0.041 -0.169 -0.210 
 (0.453) (0.477) (0.441) (0.485) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
 -0.042 -0.224 0.018 -0.199 
 (0.317) (0.342) (0.327) (0.395) 
Unemployment Rate   0.056  0.060+ 
   (0.037)  (0.036) 
Inflation   0.013**  0.010* 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Days to next election  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AIC 553.332 424.445 378.465 398.071 356.904 
BIC 568.134 472.551 432.274 449.877 414.300 
ǘ2 43.299 120.320 111.250 172.772 207.484 
Log Likelihood -272.666 -199.223 -174.233 -185.035 -162.452 
Observations 299 299 267 299 267 
Results are from a Cox Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the 
baseline hazard of termination.  Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present p-values in 
parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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Figure 1.  C-ENMI over time. 
  
 
Figure 2. Hazard Rates for Multiple Levels of C-ENMI at High Disagreement 
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Figure 3. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of a Replacement 
Cabinet from C-ENMI 
 
 
Figure 4. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of an Election from C-
ENMI 
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Online Appendix to ´:RUNLQJWKURXJKWKH,VVXHVµ 
 
 In this Appendix, I provide additional evidence in support of the results 
SUHVHQWHGLQ´:RUNLQJWKURXJKWKH,VVXHVµ,QSDUWLFXODU,SURYLGHDGHWDLOHG
discussion of the construction and validation of the primary independent variable, the 
effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI) as well as a series of sensitivity analyses to 
demonstrate the robustness of the findings presented in the main text.  I begin with a 
discussion of the operationalization of issue diversity. 
 
Measurement Appendix 
Researchers have shown increasing interest in concepts of issue salience and 
diversity. For example, public policy (e.g. Jennings et al. 2011; Boydsten et al. 2014) and 
party politics scholars (e.g. Nyblade 2004 ; Stoll 2011; Greene 2015) summarize the 
relative attention to issues in policy outputs and party manifestos using measures of 
diversity. Diversity indicators begin as a measure of entropy or the concentration of 
attention to issues on one or a small number of categories. 6KDQQRQ·V+ (Shannon 1948) 
index (Equation 1), for example, measures the extent to which a manifesto concentrates 
its attention to a small or large number of topics where, m, equals the percentage of the 
document dedicated to issue, i. Larger values indicate greater concentration to a small 
number of issues.  
Equation 2 converts 6KDQQRQ·V+ into a measure of diversity (following Jost 2006; 
see also Boydsten et al. 2014; Greene 2015). Diversity measures both the concentration 
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as well as the total number of issues. By inverting the index, issue diversity measures 
the effective number of issues.  As the example presented in Equation 3 demonstrates, 
the effective number of issues is equal to the total number of categories given attention 
when each category is given the same amount of attention.  When one or a small 
number of categories are given disproportionate attention, then the value will always be 
less than the number of categories discussed. 
 ݄ܵܽ݊݊݋݊ᇱݏܪ ൌ  െ ෍ ݉௜ ሺ݉௜ሻସଶ௜ୀଵ  (1) 
 ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ܯ݂ܽ݊݅݁ݏݐ݋ܫݏݏݑ݁ݏ ൌ ሺ݄ܵܽ݊݊݋݊ᇱݏܪሻ (2) 
 
As discussed in the main text, there are 42 categories in the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (once the directional categories are collapsed). This indicates that the 
highest value of ENMI would be 42 if all issues received the exact same attention. ENMI 
is lower in any other configuration. 
Figure A1. Issue Diversity by Party Family. 
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 I present the aggregate smoothed levels of ENMI by party family across the 
sample in Figure A1.  The figure illustrates that there is an upward trend in ENMI. This 
trend fits well with studies of issue competition that demonstrate an increase in 
competition on previously unaddressed issues such as the environment, human rights, 
or immigration (e.g. Meguid 2005, 2008). Furthermore, the increasing trend fits well 
ZLWK3U]HZRUNVLDQG6SUDJXH·VDUJXPHQWWKDW6RFLDO'HPRFUDWLFSDUWLHVKDYH
broadened their appeal to a wider range of issues as they seek to attract new 
constituencies to the party. More broadly, the parties of the traditional center left and 
right have seen the steadiest increase, consistent with the catch-all thesis (Kirchheimer 
1990).1 
 
Figure A2.  Issue Diversity in Germany. 
                                                 
1 For additional applications of this type of measure see Nyblade (2004), Stoll (2011), Greene and Jensen 
(2014) and Greene (2015). 
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Although Figure 1A demonstrates interesting trends across party types, it 
provides little information about how parties in any individual system change. To 
demonstrate variation at the individual party level, Figure 2A highlights ENMI for the 
major parties in Germany. Each of the major parties shows substantial shifts over the 
analysis period. Intriguingly, there is a slight upward trend for all parties, particularly 
near the end of the time series. The CDU discusses the greatest diversity of issues 
within the German sample in the late 1970s with an ENMI over 27. According to the 
theoretical perspective, this suggests that the CDU was quite willing to legislate on a 
range of issues following that election, but was less willing to collaborate previously in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Immediately prior to elections in 1998, all parties increased their 
ENMI, but the SPD did so quite dramatically. This trend suggests that each of the 
parties would have been capable of collaborating on a range of issues following the 
1998 election, potentially reflecting broad office seeking priorities.   
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Figure A3. ENMI and Party Seat Share/Size 
 
 A potential limitation of ENMI is that any variance in the measure might only 
capture the difference between small and large parties if only small parties adopt 
PDQLIHVWRVZLWKORZOHYHOVRIGLYHUVLW\)LJXUHSORWVSDUWLHV·(10,DJDLQVWWKHLUVHDW
shares. As Figure A3 demonstrates, this is clearly not the case, despite a positive 
FRUUHODWLRQ3HDUVRQ·V&RUUHODWLRQ&RHIILFLHQW08).  Smaller parties tend to also discuss a 
large number of issues even accounting party family. Green parties, for example, on 
average have an ENMI of over 16.5 in the sample. Small parties also discuss a large 
range of topics. The difference is rather that small and niche parties often discuss a 
different set of issues than their more mainstream competitors. Furthermore, even niche 
parties discuss traditional economic policies in their platforms, although they may not 
gain the most attention (Spoon 2011; Wagner and Meyer 2014). 
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 Another potential counter argument would be that the average ENMI may be 
just another proxy measure of disagreement or that average coalition ENMI poorly 
UHIOHFWVWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIHDFKFRDOLWLRQSDUW\·V(10,,QWKHPDLQDQDO\VLVWKH
primary independent variable is the coalition average ENMI, which reflects the average 
willingness of coalition parties to collaborate on a small or large range of issues. The 
hypotheses predict that ENMI conditions the effect of ideological disagreement in the 
coalition. Figure A4 shows the bivariate relationship between average ENMI in a 
coalition, the party with the lowest ENMI and the party with the highest ENMI with the 
amount of ideological disagreement in the coalition. Interestingly, both the lowest 
ENMI and mean ENMI are negatively related to disagreement while a coalition where 
the party with the highest level of ENMI positively correlates with disagreement. The 
relationship between mean ENMI and disagreement is negative, but only maintains a 
weak bivariate relationship. AltRJHWKHUWKHUHLVQRVWURQJUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSDUWLHV·
ENMI and disagreement, although a more detailed analysis is necessary to determine 
the full relationship between the two measures. 
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Figure 4A. Correlation of Coalition ENMI and Disagreement
 
Another concern is that a measure of central tendency, such as the average, 
XQQHFHVVDULO\WKURZVDZD\LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWHDFKSDUW\·VFRQWULEXWLRQ$QDOWHUQDWLYH
approach is to use information about the coalition partner with the lowest ENMI or the 
highest ENMI to explain a richer story about coalition negotiations.  Figure 5A shows 
the bivariate relationship between coalition duration and ENMI for the mean level, and 
the value of ENMI for the coalition parties with the lowest and highest levels. 
Intriguingly, as the conditional hypothesis might predict, the correlation of ENMI and 
duration is relatively flat for each measure on its own. While measuring ENMI as both 
the mean and the party with the lowest are weakly, positively correlated with duration, 
the party with WKHKLJKHVW(10,LVZHDNO\QHJDWLYH3HDUVRQ·VFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWV
indicate that although the measures are not exact duplicates, they are closely related to 
the mean level of ENMI. The measures based on the parties with the lowest and highest 
12
14
16
18
20
22
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Coalition Disagreement
Mean ENMI Min ENMI
Max ENMI
47 
 
ENMI are correlated at .923 and .917 with the average ENMI. These strong correlations 
LQGLFDWHWKDWWKHDYHUDJHLVOLNHO\DUHDVRQDEOHVXPPDU\RIWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VFDSDELOLW\WR
compromise. In the next section, sensitivity analyses confirm that the average succinctly 
accounts for differences in ENMI for coalition parties.  
Figure 5A. Alternate indicators of coalition ENMI. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 1 ² Is the Average Coalition ENMI a reasonable approach? 
 The average coalition ENMI necessarily ignores differences in the variance in the 
FRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV·LQGLYLGXDOYDOXHV$OWHUQDWHDSSURDFKHVPLJKWPDNHJUHDWHUXVHRIWKH
differences in variance between parties by directly including them in the analysis as 
independent variables. This approach might refocus the analysis by predicting coalition 
duration at the party level. To demonstrate the consistency of the results, I present the 
results of sensitivity analyses using alternate measures of coalition ENMI and party-
level analyses.  Largely, they confirm the results from the analysis using the average 
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coalition ENMI and indicate that differences in the variance of coalition party ENMI 
does not provide much additional information to the analysis. 
 
Minimum and Maximum ENMI. 
 In Table A1, I present the results from a sensitivity analysis which includes two 
measures of EMMI for the coalition parties with the lowest and highest values for each 
type of cabinet termination. The results largely mirror those presented in the main 
analysis. Further analyses including two variables (lowest, mean and highest ENMI) in 
the same model leads the model to be over-specified. The close correlation between the 
measures2 means that the inclusion of all three and their interactions with disagreement 
introduces serious levels of multicollinearity to the model. One method for accounting 
for multicollinearity among a series of related measures is to create an index out of the 
offending measures. The average coalition ENMI (as presented in the main analysis) 
would be one way to do reduce the collinearLW\EXWVWLOOVXPPDUL]HWKHFRDOLWLRQ·V
broad levels. I present the results of analyses with variables for ENMI of the coalition 
parties with the lowest ENMI and the highest ENMI.   
 Table A1 presents the results of the analysis with both the value of the lowest 
DQGKLJKHVWFRDOLWLRQSDUW\·V(10,3 In particular, the coefficients for the interaction of 
the minimum coalition ENMI with disagreement are in the predicted direction and 
                                                 
2 7KHPLQLPXP(10,KDVD3HDUVRQ·VFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWDQGPD[LPXP(10,KDVD
coefficient. Maximum and minimum ENMI capture somewhat more distinct information has they are 
only hold a.68 correlation coefficient.  
3 Alternate models including only the value of the lowest or only the value of the highest ENMI suggest 
that the lowest ENMI performs slightly better than the highest, but the results are largely parallel to those 
using the average coalition ENMI.  
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statistically different from zero at greater than the 90% level in nearly all of the models. 
In nearly every model, the constitutive terms for the two measures of ENMI are positive 
and the interactions with ideological disagreement are negative. The coefficients for the 
maximum coalition ENMI are in the correct direction in most models, but are not 
statistically different from zero. Interestingly, the coefficients for the interaction of the 
party with the lowest ENMI indicate that ENMI reduces the risk of termination as 
disagreement increases. Together these results might imply that the parties willing to 
negotiate on the smallest number of issues may be the limiting factor in coalition policy-
making. 
 Altogether, these results suggest some evidence in favor of the primary 
hypothesis that C-ENMI reduces the risk of early termination. This analysis should be 
considered a difficult test of the theory, as the high level of collinearity between the two 
indicators of C-ENMI likely inflates the standard errors, making statistical significance 
unlikely for these variables. Finally, tests of the non-proportionality hypothesis 
impossible due to the multicollinearity. The inclusion of any interactions with time 
leads the models to fail to converge for all failure types. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 2. Party level information  
Another approach to accRXQWLQJIRUWKHULFKLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\SDUWLHV·
ENMI would be to change the unit of analysis to the party level and to use ideological 
GLVWDQFHIURPWKHFRDOLWLRQPHDQSRVLWLRQLQVWHDGRIWKHFDELQHW·VLGHRORJLFDOUDQJH. 
Although this tactic introduces serious issues of non-independence between the 
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observations, comparable results at the party level would lend additional support to the 
XVHRIWKHFDELQHW·VPHDQOHYHORI(10,DQGWKHWKHRU\PRUHEURDGO\7KHUHIRUH,
replicate the main analyses in Table A2, Table A3 and Table A4 by changing the unit of 
analysis to the party level. 
Unsurprisingly, the results are nearly identical in each model to those presented 
in the main analysis. ENMI conditions the effect of ideological disagreement and the 
coefficients are significant in all of the models with greater than 99.9% confidence. 
To a much greater extent than in the main analysis, the Schoenfeld residuals 
indicate serious violations of the proportional hazards assumption at the party level.4 In 
the early elections model, nearly all the coefficients violate the assumption. The results 
including interactions with the log of time indicate further support for the second 
hypothesis. Consistent with the main analysis, the stabilizing effect of ENMI does not 
emerge until later in the parliamentary cycle for both types of termination.   
 
Broad conclusions on the operationalization of ENMI 
 
Altogether, the results using alternate measures of ENMI and the party level 
analysis both suggest that the results of the main analysis are representative of the 
EURDGHUWUHQG0HDQFRDOLWLRQ(10,UHDVRQDEO\FDSWXUHVWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VG\QDPLFV
Inclusion of alternate measures needlessly complicates the analysis by creating large 
                                                 
4 The increased levels of non-proportionality likely reflect issues generated by violating the independence 
assumption and including party level data as independent variables and coalition level data as the 
dependent variable. 
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levels of multicollinearity. Focusing on the party level does not fit well with the 
VWUXFWXUHRIWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHDQGYLRODWHVWKHPRGHO·VLQGHSHQGHQFHDVVXPSWLRQ
Regardless of these compromises, the results indicate broad support for the theory.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 3 ² Frailties 
In this section, I include additional robustness checks that follow alternate 
modeling choices. I first account for country and period effects using shared frailties 
(random effects) to allow for varying intercepts for coalitions that form following each 
election before presenting a parametric approach that allows for a more direct test of the 
hypotheses while including fixed effects for the country and decade.  
 
Election Frailties 
 
I present the results from the Frailty models in Table A5.  The inclusion of shared 
frailties allow for observations that follow a single election to have a distinct intercept 
similar to random effects in multilevel models. The results from this analysis are 
consistent with the theory and largely similar to those presented in the main analysis. In 
particular, the key coefficients for ideological disagreement, C-ENMI and their 
interaction are in the prediction directions and significant in the joint and replacement 
models. The coefficients indicate that ideological disagreement increases the risk of a 
replacement cabinet, but that greater ENMI decreases that risk. The coefficients are not 
significant for the risk of early elections. Furthermore, the frailty models fail to converge 
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once interactions with the log of time are included, limiting the ability to directly test 
the second hypothesis in this framework. These results indicate support for the first 
hypothesis, but at best inconclusive results for the second hypothesis.  
 
Parametric Models of Coalition Duration with Fixed Effects 
 
 While election frailties account for heterogeneity caused by processes linked to 
cabinets following the same election, the Cox Model is unable to converge with more 
complex specifications meant to account for variation in space and time. Instead, I 
replicate these analyses with the parametric Weibull event history model to allow for 
the inclusion of additional variables to account for country level and temporal effects. In 
particular, I include fixed effects for both the country and decade levels using the 
Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard. These results are largely consistent with 
those assuming an exponential hazard.  Models using the gamma distribution faced 
similar convergence problems. 
 I present the replication of the main analysis in Table A6 and Table A7.  The 
coefficients mirror those presented in the main analysis. The interaction of C-ENMI and 
ideological disagreement is negative and statistically significant in the combined risk 
and replacement risk models in Table A6. These results indicate that ideological 
disagreement increases the risk of new cabinets, while C-ENMI moderates the chance in 
risk from disagreement. 
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 To further test the second hypothesis, I rerun the analysis including interactions 
of the natural log of time with C-ENMI and the interaction of C-ENMI and ideological 
disagreement in Table A7. Table A7 demonstrates strong evidence for the second 
hypothesis. Coefficients for each of the interactions with time are negative. The 
interactions of C-ENMI and the natural log of time are strongly significant in each of the 
models. This indicates that the initial increased from disagreement is decreased by C-
ENMI at later points in the legislative cycle. Given the general increasing risk of 
termination from the baseline hazard in the Weibull model, the moderating effect of C-
ENMI becomes clear once there is a real risk of termination. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 4 ² PDDA sub-sample 
 Finally, the use of an extensive sample of parliamentary democracies with 
varying experience with democracy from a range of cultural backgrounds might imply 
that the results are being driven by the differences between older and newer 
democracies. Therefore, I re-run the analysis in Table A8 and A9 using only the 
Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008), which only provides data 
up to 1999 for Western European Democracies.  These results closely mirror to those 
presented in the main analysis in the text.  
In particular, the coefficients for the interaction of C-ENMI5 and disagreement in 
Table A8 are negative and statistically significant in the combined and replacement 
models. The coefficients fail to reach standard levels of significance for the early election 
                                                 
5 These models use coalition ENMI based on the Herfindahl index rathHUWKDQ6KDQQRQV·+VHH*UHHQH
2015). The results are substantively similar using either measure. 
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models. Table A9 presents the results with an interaction of the natural log of time. Like 
the main analysis, the effect of the key variables are in the correct direction and 
statistically significant. I present predicted effects from this analysis in Figure 6A based 
RQ/LFKW·VPHWKRG)LJXUHDGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW&-ENMI decreases the risk of 
early termination for both types, although the effect is clearest in the replacement 
models.  
 
Figure6A. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of an Election from 
C-ENMI using only the PDDA sample 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Altogether the results using alternate operationalizations of ENMI, shared 
frailties, parametric models with fixed effects or the PDDA subset provide additional 
evidence in support of the hypotheses. C-ENMI decreases the risk of failure from 
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ideological disagreement. Furthermore, the non-proportional analyses including 
interactions with time show that the effect of C-ENMI takes effect later in the 
parliamentary cycle. Ultimately, however, these tests are limited by the number of 
observations for each type of failure. Additional observations of coalition failure will 
better enable future analyses that can fully account for time in a rigorous manner. 
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Table A1. Cabinet level analysis with multiple measures of ENMI using the Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model. 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Combined 
Risk 
Combined 
Risk (Full) 
Replaceme
nt Risk plus 
Economy 
Replaceme
nt Risk 
(Full) 
Election 
Risk 
Election 
Risk (Full) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.278*** 2.416*** 2.687*** 2.754** 1.493 -0.037 
(0.561) (0.629) (0.725) (0.910) (2.207) (2.110) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X Min 
ENMI 
-0.096+ -0.094+ -0.131+ -0.161* -0.186+ -0.166 
(0.052) (0.050) (0.073) (0.081) (0.106) (0.103) 
Min ENMI 0.029 0.018 0.010 0.020 0.039 0.013 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.049) (0.053) (0.066) (0.067) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X Max 
ENMI 
-0.031 -0.051 -0.051 -0.035 0.089 0.113 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.071) (0.081) (0.140) (0.145) 
Max ENMI 0.039 0.069+ 0.089+ 0.083 -0.012 0.029 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.053) (0.061) (0.078) (0.089) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
-0.657*** -0.648*** 0.037 0.020 -0.580 -0.875* 
(0.178) (0.181) (0.389) (0.458) (0.388) (0.438) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
-1.034*** -0.981*** -0.783* -0.856* -0.774* -0.634 
(0.180) (0.188) (0.381) (0.428) (0.353) (0.409) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
0.170 0.158 0.242 0.132 -0.082 -0.092 
(0.127) (0.130) (0.265) (0.276) (0.281) (0.351) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
0.023 0.059 -0.151 -0.209 -0.389 -0.132 
(0.164) (0.172) (0.295) (0.331) (0.364) (0.410) 
Parliamentary Range -0.288* -0.278+ -0.527+ -0.622+ -0.097 0.006 
 (0.147) (0.153) (0.318) (0.340) (0.278) (0.322) 
Presidentialism 0.564* 0.357 0.537+ 0.382 0.026 0.177 
 (0.222) (0.249) (0.285) (0.421) (0.479) (0.470) 
Bicameralism 0.615** 0.645** 0.409 0.492 0.695 0.689+ 
 (0.218) (0.201) (0.317) (0.347) (0.427) (0.401) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
0.227 0.348 0.355 0.751+ -0.019 0.192 
(0.193) (0.218) (0.337) (0.384) (0.451) (0.524) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
-0.035 -0.231 0.067 -0.320 -0.161 -0.465 
(0.174) (0.210) (0.378) (0.443) (0.400) (0.459) 
Unemployment Rate  0.051***  0.019  0.077+ 
  (0.015)  (0.032)  (0.041) 
Inflation  0.007***  0.008**  0.015*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Days to next election -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001* 0.001** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
AIC 2387.576 2060.556 793.366 672.258 426.113 379.079 
BIC 2443.082 2121.539 848.872 733.242 481.620 440.062 
ǘ2 189.416 183.860 64.514 74.586 148.392 148.024 
Log Likelihood -1178.788 -1013.278 -381.683 -319.129 -198.056 -172.540 
Observations 299 267 299 267 299 267 
 
                                                 
6 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
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Table A2. Party Level Analysis for Combined Risk of Termination. 7 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Simple No Econ Full No Econ X 
ln(t) 
Full X ln(t) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.594** 3.261*** 3.153*** 3.529*** 3.201*** 
(0.794) (0.694) (0.711) (0.776) (0.837) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
ENMI 
1.080*** -0.176*** -0.180*** 1.103*** 1.101*** 
(0.142) (0.036) (0.038) (0.118) (0.120) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
ENMI X ln(t) 
-0.190***   -0.196*** -0.194*** 
(0.019)   (0.017) (0.017) 
ENMI 0.011 0.038** 0.045** 0.043** 0.046** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
 -0.571** -0.594** -0.709*** -0.720*** 
 (0.190) (0.194) (0.167) (0.171) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
 -0.993*** -0.928*** -0.980*** -0.903*** 
 (0.170) (0.175) (0.151) (0.161) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
 0.163 0.138 0.170 0.143 
  (0.131) (0.133) (0.120) (0.124) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
 -0.047 0.003 0.022 0.066 
  (0.177) (0.185) (0.142) (0.147) 
Parliamentary Range  -0.210 -0.229 -0.371** -0.379** 
  (0.152) (0.159) (0.131) (0.138) 
Presidentialism  0.587** 0.510* 0.550** 0.450+ 
  (0.201) (0.235) (0.194) (0.232) 
Bicameralism  0.711** 0.745*** 0.671*** 0.709*** 
  (0.219) (0.209) (0.186) (0.178) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
 0.145 0.200 -0.022 0.031 
 (0.201) (0.227) (0.184) (0.207) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
 0.025 -0.134 -0.043 -0.163 
 (0.187) (0.220) (0.197) (0.223) 
Unemployment Rate   0.034*  0.034* 
   (0.015)  (0.015) 
Inflation   0.007***  0.006*** 
   (0.002)  (0.001) 
Days to next election  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AIC 8196.244 8275.529 7202.804 7871.617 6847.825 
BIC 8215.130 8336.908 7271.984 7937.717 6921.618 
ǘ2 131.495 178.523 176.284 489.534 466.705 
Log Likelihood -4094.122 -4124.765 -3586.402 -3921.809 -3407.913 
Observations 830 830 744 830 744 
 
  
                                                 
7 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
58 
 
Table A3. Party Level Analysis for Replacement Risk of Termination. 8 
 (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Simple No Econ Full No Econ X 
ln(t) 
Full X ln(t) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
4.749*** 3.568*** 3.736*** 5.146*** 5.228*** 
(1.091) (1.032) (1.091) (1.139) (1.145) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
ENMI 
1.441*** -0.231** -0.233** 1.508*** 1.470*** 
(0.307) (0.071) (0.076) (0.252) (0.227) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
ENMI X ln(t) 
-0.271***   -0.279*** -0.273*** 
(0.043)   (0.036) (0.033) 
ENMI 0.032 0.038+ 0.042+ 0.061** 0.063* 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
 0.210 0.065 0.096 -0.058 
 (0.402) (0.448) (0.388) (0.421) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
 -0.640+ -0.769+ -0.497 -0.656 
 (0.372) (0.410) (0.380) (0.418) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
 0.329 0.138 0.297 0.140 
 (0.268) (0.278) (0.258) (0.262) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
 -0.122 -0.102 -0.159 -0.185 
 (0.287) (0.310) (0.280) (0.296) 
Parliamentary Range  -0.471+ -0.547+ -0.683** -0.784** 
  (0.281) (0.310) (0.246) (0.258) 
Presidentialism  0.672* 0.735+ 0.633* 0.723+ 
  (0.289) (0.395) (0.258) (0.372) 
Bicameralism  0.464 0.679+ 0.408 0.654* 
  (0.331) (0.364) (0.299) (0.320) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
 0.239 0.600 0.014 0.337 
 (0.360) (0.401) (0.364) (0.411) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
 0.218 -0.147 0.134 -0.170 
 (0.392) (0.458) (0.448) (0.485) 
Unemployment Rate   -0.001  -0.005 
   (0.028)  (0.029) 
Inflation   0.010***  0.009*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Days to next election  0.001* 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AIC 2656.993 2800.325 2339.707 2590.615 2157.074 
BIC 2675.878 2861.704 2408.887 2656.715 2230.867 
ǘ2 70.262 52.053 73.261 140.471 166.856 
Log Likelihood -1324.496 -1387.163 -1154.853 -1281.307 -1062.537 
Observations 830 830 744 830 744 
 
  
                                                 
8 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
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Table A4. Party Level Analysis for the Risk of New Elections. 9 
 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
 Simple No Econ Full No Econ X 
ln(t) 
Full X ln(t) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.904* 3.936* 2.381 4.856* 2.851 
(1.442) (1.932) (1.689) (1.931) (1.915) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
ENMI 
1.165*** -0.154 -0.106 0.858** 0.851** 
(0.178) (0.108) (0.098) (0.292) (0.289) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
ENMI X ln(t) 
-0.226***   -0.175*** -0.163*** 
(0.031)   (0.045) (0.043) 
ENMI -0.001 0.012 0.022 0.018 0.023 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
 -0.427 -0.679 -0.544 -0.813+ 
 (0.391) (0.459) (0.375) (0.442) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
 -0.905* -0.767+ -0.987** -0.836* 
 (0.353) (0.415) (0.356) (0.411) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
 -0.039 -0.062 -0.005 -0.023 
 (0.284) (0.320) (0.284) (0.314) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
 -0.573+ -0.383 -0.449 -0.234 
 (0.335) (0.371) (0.329) (0.358) 
Parliamentary Range  -0.103 -0.090 -0.213 -0.233 
  (0.247) (0.263) (0.244) (0.277) 
Presidentialism  0.241 0.377 0.247 0.383 
  (0.401) (0.479) (0.381) (0.444) 
Bicameralism  0.823* 0.855* 0.765+ 0.778* 
  (0.401) (0.381) (0.399) (0.386) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
 -0.180 -0.189 -0.322 -0.351 
 (0.477) (0.494) (0.461) (0.486) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
 -0.077 -0.452 -0.034 -0.437 
 (0.346) (0.413) (0.336) (0.454) 
Unemployment Rate   0.045  0.047 
   (0.042)  (0.040) 
Inflation   0.015***  0.013** 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
Days to next election  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AIC 1874.393 1477.187 1294.927 1424.914 1251.927 
BIC 1893.279 1538.565 1364.108 1491.014 1325.719 
ǘ2 59.048 148.137 127.455 241.278 264.232 
Log Likelihood -933.197 -725.593 -632.463 -698.457 -609.963 
Observations 830 830 744 830 744 
 
  
                                                 
9 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
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Table A5. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis with Election Frailty.10 
 (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 Combined 
Risk 
Combined 
Risk (Full) 
Replaceme
nt Risk 
Replaceme
ntRisk 
(Full) 
Election 
Risk 
Election 
Risk (Full) 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.456*** 2.340** 2.843** 3.018** 2.989 1.543 
(0.685) (0.793) (0.981) (1.069) (1.826) (1.955) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
-0.124** -0.121** -0.170** -0.182** -0.137 -0.083 
(0.039) (0.044) (0.060) (0.066) (0.102) (0.107) 
C-ENMI 0.067* 0.073** 0.087+ 0.095* 0.049 0.052 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.045) (0.048) (0.055) (0.053) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
-0.612** -0.480* 0.103 0.010 -0.470 -0.732+ 
(0.202) (0.212) (0.385) (0.415) (0.398) (0.427) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
-1.052*** -0.856*** -0.852* -0.933* -0.771* -0.675 
(0.188) (0.200) (0.365) (0.383) (0.380) (0.419) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
0.170 0.128 0.231 0.101 -0.079 -0.135 
(0.136) (0.147) (0.246) (0.264) (0.294) (0.338) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
0.016 -0.014 -0.158 -0.139 -0.411 -0.127 
(0.155) (0.169) (0.284) (0.306) (0.356) (0.394) 
Parliamentary Range -0.326* -0.284+ -0.608* -0.677* -0.129 -0.104 
 (0.150) (0.161) (0.278) (0.303) (0.288) (0.316) 
Presidentialism 0.638** 0.506* 0.666+ 0.587 0.257 0.420 
(0.222) (0.255) (0.351) (0.424) (0.508) (0.564) 
Bicameralism 0.681*** 0.635** 0.451 0.610+ 0.856* 0.844* 
 (0.190) (0.195) (0.349) (0.370) (0.410) (0.426) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
0.243 0.250 0.405 0.743* -0.061 -0.041 
(0.202) (0.211) (0.338) (0.369) (0.482) (0.545) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
-0.034 0.004 0.018 -0.333 -0.042 -0.224 
(0.221) (0.225) (0.401) (0.454) (0.449) (0.501) 
Unemployment 
Rate11 
 -0.155*  0.012  0.056 
  (0.078)  (0.031)  (0.041) 
Inflation  0.274***  0.011**  0.013** 
  (0.068)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Days to next election -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
AIC 2386.436 2002.893 793.319 671.707 424.445 378.465 
BIC 2434.542 2056.361 841.425 725.515 472.551 432.274 
ǘ2 191.154 158.685 40.536 44.327 113.906 100.906 
Log Likelihood -1180.218 -986.447 -383.660 -320.853 -199.223 -174.233 
Observations 299 261 299 267 299 267 
 
 
                                                 
10 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. 
11 The unemployment rate and inflation variables caused the joint models to not converge. The results 
presented in Model 23 use transformed values of these variables, using the inverse of the unemployment 
rate (1/unemployment rate) and the natural log of inflation.  Model 25 and Model 27 use the 
untransformed values.  
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Table A6.  Parametric Survival Model (Weibull distribution) with country and 
decade fixed effects. 12 
 (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) 
 Combined 
Risk 
Combined 
Risk (Full) 
Replaceme
nt Risk 
Replaceme
ntRisk 
(Full) 
Election 
Risk 
Election 
Risk (Full) 
       
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.626*** 2.552*** 4.779*** 5.823*** 4.489* 0.538 
(0.571) (0.552) (1.413) (1.641) (2.104) (2.116) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
-0.126*** -0.131*** -0.278** -0.336** -0.206 -0.007 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.094) (0.107) (0.132) (0.160) 
C-ENMI 0.098*** 0.095** 0.211** 0.200* 0.095 0.052 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.075) (0.079) (0.082) (0.101) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
-0.928*** -0.816** -0.296 -0.755 -1.049+ -1.118+ 
(0.268) (0.256) (0.696) (0.707) (0.556) (0.576) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
-1.171*** -1.068*** -1.652* -2.129** -1.417* -0.982 
(0.223) (0.240) (0.686) (0.753) (0.687) (1.002) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
0.141 0.079 0.379 0.097 0.152 0.461 
(0.135) (0.158) (0.349) (0.465) (0.458) (0.584) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
-0.093 -0.054 -0.571 -0.425 -0.672 -0.212 
(0.192) (0.203) (0.431) (0.466) (0.520) (0.802) 
Parliamentary Range -0.430** -0.413* -0.802 -0.585 -0.210 -0.850 
 (0.160) (0.169) (0.530) (0.537) (0.498) (0.791) 
Presidentialism -0.216 -0.239 -1.557 -1.217 -0.636 -0.723 
 (0.653) (0.666) (1.002) (1.092) (0.936) (1.797) 
Bicameralism -2.681*** -2.541*** -2.392*** -2.852** -6.368*** -9.029*** 
 (0.369) (0.384) (0.579) (0.909) (1.443) (2.598) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
-2.773*** -2.945*** 0.268 13.279*** -8.270*** -10.083*** 
(0.748) (0.753) (1.394) (1.521) (1.872) (2.674) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
-1.199* -0.757 -2.312** -16.162*** -15.162*** -15.491*** 
(0.600) (0.750) (0.847) (1.039) (1.209) (1.455) 
Unemployment 
Rate13 
 0.026  -0.036  0.087 
  (0.024)  (0.085)  (0.110) 
Inflation  0.011***  0.005  0.026*** 
  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Days to next election -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.003* 0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
AIC 609.912 555.756 418.440 349.143 239.217 211.385 
BIC 761.631 710.008 581.260 478.013 402.036 372.811 
Log Likelihood -263.956 -234.878 -165.220 -138.571 -75.608 -60.693 
Observations 299 267 299 265 299 267 
 
  
                                                 
12 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. 
13 Model 31 for replacement cabinets would not converge when the raw unemployment rate was 
included. Model 31 in Table A6 presents the results transformed with unemployment rate transformed to 
one divided by the natural log of the unemployment rate. 
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Table A7.  Parametric Survival Model (Weibull distribution) with country and 
decade fixed effects and non-proportional effects. 14 
 (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
 Combined 
Risk 
Combined 
Risk (Full) 
Replaceme
nt Risk 
Replaceme
ntRisk 
(Full) 
Election 
Risk 
Election 
Risk (Full) 
       
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.793*** 2.768*** 6.616*** 7.423*** 5.014** 1.799 
(0.683) (0.716) (1.676) (1.915) (1.855) (1.901) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
0.867*** 0.848*** 0.966*** 1.046*** 0.565** 0.746** 
(0.084) (0.086) (0.131) (0.171) (0.213) (0.249) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI X ln(time) 
-0.150*** -0.148*** -0.200*** -0.220*** -0.132*** -0.132*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.035) 
C-ENMI 0.116*** 0.105** 0.276*** 0.273** 0.107 0.084 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.082) (0.098) (0.071) (0.094) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
-1.239*** -1.148*** -0.496 -0.566 -1.148* -1.264* 
(0.234) (0.225) (0.613) (0.619) (0.516) (0.534) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
-1.178*** -1.067*** -1.673* -1.859* -1.298* -0.943 
(0.226) (0.253) (0.676) (0.732) (0.640) (0.851) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
0.006 -0.031 0.320 0.075 -0.062 0.165 
(0.147) (0.168) (0.357) (0.484) (0.458) (0.472) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
-0.234 -0.101 -0.881+ -0.597 -0.886+ -0.567 
(0.171) (0.173) (0.484) (0.616) (0.476) (0.556) 
Parliamentary Range -0.644*** -0.642*** -1.604* -1.129+ -0.633 -1.277 
 (0.172) (0.188) (0.671) (0.656) (0.629) (0.892) 
Presidentialism -0.613 -0.665 -1.928** -1.411+ -1.573+ -1.549 
 (0.935) (0.981) (0.672) (0.808) (0.943) (1.388) 
Bicameralism -2.612*** -2.636*** -1.441* -2.458* -5.770*** -8.278*** 
 (0.296) (0.295) (0.607) (0.989) (1.397) (2.249) 
Abs. Majority 
Confidence 
-2.887*** -3.198*** -0.335 14.489*** -7.623*** -9.529*** 
(0.656) (0.718) (1.297) (1.568) (1.917) (2.687) 
Constructive 
Confidence 
-1.793* -1.340 -3.358** -21.378*** -16.887*** -14.238*** 
(0.729) (0.969) (1.246) (1.914) (1.476) (1.541) 
Unemployment 
Rate15 
 0.030  -0.207  0.148 
 (0.029)  (0.371)  (0.117) 
Inflation  0.005**  0.001  0.021*** 
  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Days to next election -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.004** 0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
AIC 384.668 352.675 327.104 238.008 212.987 188.541 
BIC 540.087 506.926 493.624 324.102 372.106 349.967 
Log Likelihood -150.334 -133.337 -118.552 -95.004 -63.494 -49.270 
Observations 299 267 299 267 299 267 
 
                                                 
14 Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. 
15 Model 37 for replacement cabinets would not converge when the raw unemployment rate was 
included. Model 37 in Table A7 presents the results with the natural log of the unemployment rate.  
63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis using only the PDDA sample16 
 (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) 
 Combined 
Risk 1 
Combined 
Risk 2 
Replaceme
nt Risk 1 
Replaceme
nt Risk 2 
Election 
Risk 1 
Election 
Risk 2 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
2.221*** 2.211*** 2.231*** 2.351*** 0.051 0.665 
(0.654) (0.572) (0.504) (0.540) (1.059) (1.052) 
C-ENMI 0.088* 0.095* 0.079** 0.101*** 0.025 0.043 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.024) (0.026) (0.059) (0.057) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X 
C-ENMI 
-0.131** -0.134** -0.134** -0.153*** 0.009 -0.023 
(0.050) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.080) (0.081) 
Coalition 
Agreement 
0.092 0.295 -0.450 -0.642 0.181 0.750+ 
(0.351) (0.341) (0.335) (0.398) (0.539) (0.441) 
Policies in Coal 
Agreement 
-0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.020*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
0.732** 0.600* 0.627** 0.779*** -0.293 -1.176+ 
(0.225) (0.236) (0.200) (0.205) (0.442) (0.634) 
Minimum 
Winning 
Coalition 
-1.622*** -1.295*** -1.076*** -1.008*** -1.232* -1.006+ 
(0.293) (0.307) (0.272) (0.283) (0.481) (0.588) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
0.107 0.139 0.123 0.019 -0.066 -0.001 
(0.194) (0.210) (0.169) (0.184) (0.306) (0.305) 
New Cabinet -0.031 -0.014 -0.530+ -0.417+ 0.125 0.302 
(0.304) (0.283) (0.282) (0.250) (0.461) (0.479) 
Investiture Vote 0.492 0.303 0.447 0.179 0.709 0.684 
(0.355) (0.342) (0.280) (0.324) (0.562) (0.520) 
Presidentialism 0.719* 0.336 1.159*** 1.176*** 0.582 0.304 
(0.316) (0.305) (0.271) (0.263) (0.495) (0.574) 
Bicameralism 0.959** 0.820** 0.869** 1.030** 0.380 0.364 
(0.329) (0.315) (0.289) (0.335) (0.517) (0.544) 
Dimension By 
Dimension 
Median 
-0.598+ -0.498 -0.187 -0.111 -1.083 -1.114 
(0.311) (0.304) (0.224) (0.233) (0.676) (0.694) 
Parliamentary 
Range 
-0.356 -0.254 -0.313 -0.116 0.020 -0.131 
(0.277) (0.257) (0.226) (0.228) (0.350) (0.353) 
Days to Next 
Election 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.022*  0.006  0.057*** 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
                                                 
16 Results are from a Cox Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients 
represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are 
clustered on the election date. I present p-values in parentheses. All significance tests 
are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Unemployment 
Rate 
 0.065**  0.024  0.184*** 
 (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.038) 
AIC 1416.993 1200.486 1504.276 1241.928 477.212 395.310 
BIC 1469.934 1257.628 1557.218 1299.070 530.153 452.452 
ǘ2 92.766 90.499 178.791 139.470 77.987 112.410 
Log Likelihood -693.496 -583.243 -737.138 -603.964 -223.606 -180.655 
Observations 252 213 252 213 252 213 
 
 
 
 
Table A9. Non-Proportional Hazards Analysis using only the PDDA sample17 
 (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) 
 Combined 
Risk 1 
Combined 
Risk 2 
Replaceme
nt Risk 1 
Replaceme
nt Risk 2 
Election 
Risk 1 
Election 
Risk 2 
Ideological 
Disagreement 
0.913 0.558 1.294 1.096 -1.268 -0.555 
(1.013) (0.934) (0.833) (0.786) (1.191) (1.101) 
C-ENMI 2.267*** 2.537*** 1.813*** 2.121*** 2.471*** 2.381*** 
 (0.282) (0.302) (0.210) (0.228) (0.512) (0.493) 
C-ENMI X ln(days) -0.355*** -0.395*** -0.276*** -0.318*** -0.387*** -0.370*** 
(0.046) (0.050) (0.034) (0.036) (0.079) (0.076) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI 
0.307* 0.411** 0.229 0.342* 0.423* 0.570* 
(0.148) (0.158) (0.147) (0.161) (0.180) (0.239) 
Ideological 
Disagreement X C-
ENMI X ln(days) 
-0.046 -0.058+ -0.040 -0.055* -0.047 -0.073+ 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.036) (0.039) 
Coalition 
Agreement 
0.639+ 0.816+ -0.044 -0.304 0.878 1.519* 
(0.329) (0.425) (0.295) (0.351) (0.568) (0.600) 
Policies in Coal 
Agreement 
-0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.003 -0.012* -0.026*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Surplus Majority 
Coalition 
0.295 0.279 0.321+ 0.534* -1.060* -1.749* 
(0.183) (0.216) (0.192) (0.223) (0.514) (0.694) 
Minimum Winning 
Coalition 
-1.040** -0.653* -0.502 -0.365 -0.472 -0.146 
(0.340) (0.265) (0.379) (0.360) (0.427) (0.527) 
Ideol. Connected 
Coalition 
-0.051 -0.132 -0.127 -0.300+ -0.445 -0.284 
(0.182) (0.177) (0.187) (0.179) (0.290) (0.309) 
New Cabinet 0.107 0.233 -0.508 -0.278 0.014 0.374 
 (0.255) (0.283) (0.336) (0.332) (0.498) (0.532) 
Investiture Vote 0.076 -0.197 -0.089 -0.377 0.187 0.033 
 (0.286) (0.314) (0.322) (0.416) (0.505) (0.495) 
Presidentialism 0.274 -0.221 0.679* 0.556+ -0.184 -0.712 
 (0.311) (0.288) (0.327) (0.296) (0.523) (0.606) 
Bicameralism 0.942*** 0.799** 0.865** 0.951* 0.370 0.142 
                                                 
17 Results are from a Cox Non-Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. 
Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination.  Standard errors 
are clustered on the election date. I present p-values in parentheses. All significance 
tests are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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 (0.280) (0.290) (0.322) (0.382) (0.424) (0.466) 
Dimension By 
Dimension Median 
-0.138 0.036 0.249 0.507* -0.490 -0.565 
(0.231) (0.257) (0.217) (0.251) (0.485) (0.505) 
Parliamentary 
Range 
-0.815** -0.556* -0.471+ -0.240 0.169 -0.009 
(0.297) (0.225) (0.257) (0.220) (0.312) (0.334) 
Days to Next 
Election 
0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001+ -0.001* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Inflation  0.015+  -0.007  0.059** 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.019) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 0.028  -0.012  0.183*** 
 (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.048) 
AIC 1009.800 821.588 1211.835 962.385 343.342 287.491 
BIC 1069.801 885.452 1271.835 1026.250 403.342 351.356 
ǘ2 200.516 178.406 191.955 183.301 120.838 92.986 
Log Likelihood -487.900 -391.794 -588.917 -462.192 -154.671 -124.746 
Observations 252 213 252 213 252 213 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 According to the ERDDA, Belgian coalitions last approximately 1 year 8 months in the 
sample. 
2 )ROORZLQJ/DYHU,GHILQHFRDOLWLRQGXUDWLRQDVWKH´HODSVHGWLPHEHWZHHQWKH
IRUPDWLRQRIDJRYHUQPHQWDQGLWVWHUPLQDWLRQµ,FRQVLGHUJRYHUQPHQW
WHUPLQDWLRQVIURPWKHIROORZLQJFDXVHV´7KHUHLVDQHOHFWLRQWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU
changes; the partisan composition of the cabinet changes; the government voluntarily or 
LQYROXQWDULO\UHVLJQVDQGWKHKHDGRIVWDWHVXEVHTXHQWO\DFFHSWVWKLVUHVLJQDWLRQµ/DYHU
2003, 26). 
3 Parties value policy accountability either because they are policy motivated or 
instrumentally in order to avoid being labeled as lacking accountability (Strøm 1990). 
4 7KLVIUDPHZRUNILWVZHOOZLWKWKHORJLFRI.LUFKHLPHU·VFRQFHSWRIWKHFDWFK-all 
party. Kircheimer (1990) argues that catch-all parties decrease their dependence on 
traditional ideological constituents by appealing to all constituencies in society. These 
parties address more diverse policies because they seek to maintain broad electoral 
support (Kirchheimer 1990). For example, socialist parties across Europe seeking to 
widen their electoral appeal decreased their policy focus on labor issues and increased 
the breadth of issues in their platforms (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). However, more 
issue or policy focused parties such as green or anti-immigrant parties tend to be 
motivated by a specific, limited set of issues such as the environment or immigration. 
Although these parties also consider their electoral success, they historically tend to be 
motivated more by their policy goals than socialist or conservative parties that offer 
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more comprehensive electoral platforms (Adams et al. 2006; Spoon 2011; Meyer and 
Wagner 2013; Meyer and Miller 2015). 
5 Scholars dedicate substantial attention to WKHUROHRISDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVDQGLVVXH
salience in election campaigns. See for example, Adams (1999), Ezrow (2007), Green and 
Hobolt (2008), Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), Somer-Topcu (2009), Ezrow et al. 
(2011), Green (2011), Spoon (2011), de Vries and Hobolt (2012) and Greene (2015). 
6 In this context, coalition ministers may have greater autonomy akin to Laver and 
6KHSVOH·VSRUWIROLRGLFWDWRUVKLSV 
7 Unlike Laver and Shepsle (1996), this perspective assumes that ministers do not hold 
complete dictatorships over policy-making in their respective issue jurisdictions, but 
instead engage in compromise on each issue. Laver DQG6KHSVOH·V (1996) approach 
might suggest that instead of perceiving coalitions as a series of issue based 
compromises, parties are given complete discretion on the portfolios under their 
control. From their perspective, ENMI might matter differently, as parties with greater 
attention to a small number of issues would focus their policy resources on those issues. 
This would suggest that issue focused parties could engage in log rolls or policy trades 
WKDWPLJKWLQVWHDGLQFUHDVHWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VVWDELOLW\3DUWLHVGHGLFating their attention to 
a smaller number of issues would provide coalitions with the opportunity to use log 
rolls between coalition partners to arrive at agreements. This approach would then 
suggest that parties focused intensely on a small number of issues might actually 
stabilize coalitions in the face of strong ideological disagreements by allowing for policy 
swaps across issues. There is substantial evidence, however, that coalitions use 
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numerous tools to oversee the policy behaviors of coalition partners, particularly when 
WKH\DUHLGHRORJLFDOO\GLVWDQWDQGKROGWKHSRUWIROLR·VLVVXHVKLJKO\VDOLHQWHJ6DDOIHOG
2000; Thies 2011; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and 
Jensen 2014). Coalition oversight suggests that parties attempt to constrain the 
behaviors of ministers from other parties. This evidence is inconsistent with Laver and 
6KHSOVH·VSHUVSHFWLYHRIPLQLVWHUVDVSROLF\GLFWDWRUV 
8 The usage of tools such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny on salient 
issues by coalition partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014), 
OLNHO\SURYLGHVWKHPHFKDQLVPIRUSDUWLHVWRPRQLWRUWKHLUFRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUV·SROLF\
drift (Thies 2001). Other mechanisms for parliamentary oversight such as committees or 
resignation rules mean that salient divisions will likely cause coalitions to terminate 
PRUHTXLFNO\DVGLYLVLRQVKDYHVWURQJHUFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUFRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV·SROLF\
images and ability to control government (Saalfeld 2000).  
9 Like Strom and Swindle (2002), I count early elections as those held more than 90 days 
before the next mandatory election. 
10 I present the results from analyses using only the sample (15 countries up to 1999) 
from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (PDDA) in the Appendix (Strøm et al. 
2008).  
11 The sample includes observations from  all coalition governments in Austria (1949-
2008), Belgium (1946-2007), Bulgaria(2005), Czech Republic (1992-2010), Denmark (1950- 
2007), Estonia (1995-2009),  Finland (1945-2007), France (1959-1999), Germany (1949-
2009), Greece (1989), Iceland (1946-2009), Ireland (1948-2007), Italy (1946-2006), 
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Latvia(1998-2006), Lithuania (2000-2001),  Luxembourg (1945-2009), the Netherlands 
(1946-2010), Norway (1963-2009), Poland(1991-2007), Portugal (1978-1985), Romania 
(1991-2009), Slovakia (1998-2010), Slovenia (1990-2008), and Sweden (1951-2006). 
12 For similar measures of issue salience and party politics, see Nyblade (2004), Stoll 
(2011), or Greene (2015). 
13 See the Online Appendix for a more detailed discussion of ENMI.  
14 Intriguingly, C-ENMI is only weakly associated with coalition duration in the full 
VDPSOH3HDUVRQV·FRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQW(10,GRHVPRUHWKDQFDpture the 
difference between party size. The variables only weakly correlate (.1).  For additional 
information on the construction and distribution of ENMI, see the Appendix. 
15 Results are similar for models that use the coalition-party as the unit of analysis, 
although the effect of nearly all the independent variables becomes non-proportional, 
VXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIWKHVHYDULDEOHVRQSDUWLHV·VWUDWHJLHVLVOLNHO\GLIIHUHQW
GHSHQGLQJRQWKHSRLQWLQWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VOLIHF\FOH$VDQDOWHUQDWHVWUDWegy, I also ran 
the analysis using multiple measures of ENMI to account for the party with the lowest 
and the highest levels of ENMI in the coalition. Intriguingly, mean coalition ENMI 
performs the best as it integrates information from each of the coalition parties. For 
additional information and the results of these replications, see the Appendix.   
16 :KLOHPDQ\VFKRODUVFLWHWKHVKRUWFRPLQJVRIWKH&03·VOHIW-right scale, they suggest 
improvements to this scale to make its estimates more reliable. In particular, Lowe et al. 
XVHDORJJHGVFDOHWRPRUHDFFXUDWHO\PHDVXUHWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISDUWLHV·
71 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferences. 7KLVLVVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWWKDQ6DDOIHOG·VDQDO\VLVZKLFKXVHVWKH
original left-right scale. 
17 Data on pre- and post-electoral agreement and a count of the number of policies 
included in the coalition agreement are included in a sub-sample analysis of the data 
from the PDDA in the Appendix (Golder 2006; Eichorst 2014; Ibenskas 2015). More 
expansive coalition agreements should suggest a more durable coalition. The results are 
substantively similar to those presented in the main analysis.  
18 To account for potential confounding heterogeneity from country or period effects, I 
have run a series of robustness checks that include fixed effects for country and decades 
in a Weibull model, and shared frailty (random effects) for election date effects. These 
results are largely consistent with the theory and are presented in the Online Appendix.  
19 The models presented in Table 3 only include interactions with the variables 
proposed to violate the assumption.  Robustness checks accounting for all variables that 
violate the proportional hazards assumption fail to converge in most cases. In an 
analysis that selectively controls for these violations to account for the strongest levels 
of significance, I find results substantively similar to those presented in the main 
analysis, although high levels of multicollinearity lead many models to not converge.  
20 Given the theoretical expectation for the violation of the Proportional Hazard 
Assumption it is unsurprising that no variables are significant in a simple version of the 
model without the interaction of time.  
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21 The predicted hazard rates are based on the estimates in Model 8. The Wald test of 
the joint significance of the coefficients for C-ENMI, ideological disagreement and their 
interaction is significant at the 99.9% level in both Model 7 and Model 8.  
22 While previous studies have not revealed statistically significant non-
proportionalities (Warwick 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999), strategic bargaining 
contexts such as coalition governance make the presence of non-proportionalities 
unsurprising (Licht 2011). Statistically, the non-proportionalities can be directly 
modeled by including an interaction of the variables violating the assumption with a 
function of time to allow the effect of the variable to change (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004; Licht 2011). Models in which each variable violating the proportional 
hazards assumption is interacted with time fail to converge. Therefore, I only present 
models with the variable that the theory predicts a violation interacted with time. The 
results are largely consistent when other violating variables are also included, although 
many of these models fail to converge due to multicollinearity. 
23 The combined risk and the risk of new elections fail the PHA at the 95% and 99.9% 
levels, but global tests of the Schoenfeld residuals do not show evidence that the PHA is 
violated in the primary models at standard levels of significance.  
24 Many of the residuals are statistically significant at the .01 level. Analyses with 
interactions for the log of time with C-ENMI, C-ENMI X ideological disagreement and a 
number of the control variables fail to converge.  
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25 Direct interpretation of the coefficients deserves caution due to the large number of 
interactions (for further discussion of non-proportionalities and their interpretation see 
Licht 2011).  
26 I exclude low and high values of the dependent variable from the prediction for 
graphical clarity. The confidence intervals in the first year are sufficiently large to make 
all differences following that time difficult to visually interpret. The first difference 
percentage predicted change to the hazard rate is for a change from one standard 
deviation below the mean C-ENMI to one deviation above the mean C-ENMI holding 
disagreement at the minimum value and at two standard deviations above the mean. 
95% confidence intervals around the median calculated change are based on a draw of 
1000 estimates from the variance-covariance matrix of a Non Proportional Hazards 
(NPH) Cox model. Estimates are from Model 9 and Model 14 using Licht's (2011) 
method of calculating First Differences for COX NPH models. Predicted effects are 
smoothed using lowess. 
27 The strong increase in risk across the models might be overstated given that the 
baseline hazard of failure for either type is extremely low in the first year of the 
coalition. 
28 The 1988 five party cabinet led by Marten included five parties with a coalition 
average ENMI of nearly 20 (nearly half a standard deviation above the mean sample 
coalition ENMI) and lasted 1238 days, despite over a standard deviation above mean 
disagreement (.963). 
